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Plea bargaining dominates the criminal process in the United 
States today, yet it remains highly controversial. Supporters 
defend it on the grounds that it expedites cases, reduces 
processing costs, and helps authorities obtain cooperation from 
defendants. But critics contend that it can generate arbitrary 
sentencing disparities, obscure the true facts, and even lead 
innocent defendants to plead guilty. Lack of transparency and 
limited judicial involvement frustrate attempts to correct flaws 
in the process. As policymakers and legislators prepare to tackle 
reform of sentencing laws and prosecutorial discretion, they 
should also consider reforms to plea bargaining that would 
make the practice fairer, more transparent, and more honest.
INTRODUCTION
As the Supreme Court recently acknowledged, in the U.S., “criminal justice 
today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”1 More than 
95% of convictions in the federal and state systems are the product of negotiated 
guilty pleas.2  Roughly every two seconds during typical work hours, a person 
pleads guilty.3 In some jurisdictions, individual prosecutors may practice for 
months without trying a case.4 Courts, policymakers and scholars for the most 
part view plea bargaining as an inevitable feature of our criminal process. The 
general assumption is that without guilty pleas, the criminal justice system 
1. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012).
2. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2012—
STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.4.2 (2015) (97% of federal convictions disposed of via guilty plea). For 
state statistics, see BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF 
CONVICTED FELONS, 2004—STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.4.1 (2004) (95% of state convictions obtained 
through a guilty plea); Court Statistics Project DataViewer, NAT’L CTR FOR STATE COURTS, http://
www.ncsc.org/Sitecore/Content/Microsites/PopUp/Home/CSP/CSP_Criminal (showing that 
for most states, jury trials amounted to only about 1-2% of criminal dispositions).
3. Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 696 (2001).
4. Don Stemen et al., Plea Bargaining in Wisconsin: Prosecutor Effects on Charge Reductions 
Outcomes 9 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (noting that “there are many 
prosecutors with no trials over the study period,” 2009-2013).
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would grind to a “screeching halt.”5 Even if the system could afford to provide 
more contested trials than it currently does, many believe that plea bargaining 
helps allocate resources more sensibly—away from trials of clear-cut cases and 
toward more valuable programs, such as probation, parole, and reentry.6
Another stated advantage of plea bargaining is that it helps the prosecution 
to obtain cooperation in complex cases. Informants are often indispensable to 
uncovering the operation of organized crime, for example, and plea discounts 
can be critical to obtaining their cooperation.7 Plea bargaining has also been 
defended for sparing reluctant and vulnerable witnesses the ordeal of testifying 
and for providing victims with closure more quickly than trials do.8 Some 
courts and commentators have also stated that guilty pleas can facilitate the 
rehabilitation of defendants by encouraging them to accept responsibility and 







5. Eileen Nimm, Plea Bargains Crucial to Efficient Court System, APG MEDIA WISCONSIN 
(July 6, 2016), http://www.apg-wi.com/plea-bargains-crucial-to-efficient-court-system/article_
c73f2715-fbb7-5c89-953f-b135b0aa257d.html (citing Wisconsin prosecutor); see also Santobello 
v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of American Criminal 
Justice, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1099, 1138-44 (2014) (discussing various benefits of plea bargaining, 
including its efficiency). But see DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE 104-05, 154-55 
(2016); Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering Wound, 51 DUQ. 
L. REV. 673, 705 (2013); Mary E. Vogel, The Negotiated Guilty Plea: Vacancies as an Alternative 
to the Caseload Pressure Explanation, 21 J. MATH. SOCIOLOGY 241, 241 (1996) (noting that “the 
claim that crowded courts induce plea bargaining as part of an effort by prosecutors, judges and 
attorneys to move cases more rapidly has been called increasingly into question”).
6. See, e.g., Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. 
L. REV. 439, 440-41 (1971) (quoting Arnold Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in PRESIDENT’S 
COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 108, 112 
(1967)); see also Susan Turner, “Reentry,” in Volume 4 of the present Report. 
7. See, e.g., Daniel Richman, “Informants and Cooperators,” in Volume 2 of the present 
Report; ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 31 (2009); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Defendants: The Costs and Benefits of 
Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 292, 293 (1996). 
8. Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 1142. For a discussion of crime victims in the criminal process, 
see Paul G. Cassell, “Crime Victims’ Rights,” in the present Volume.
9. E.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970); Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 1142. For 
a discussion of rehabilitation, see Francis T. Cullen, “Correctional Rehabilitation,” in Volume 4 of 
the present Report.
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These perceived advantages of plea bargaining have made it an increasingly 
popular feature of criminal justice reform around the world. Countries as 
diverse as France, Germany, India, Japan, Nigeria, Russia, and South Africa 
have adopted some form of negotiated justice.10 Even international criminal 
courts, dealing with the gravest crimes against humanity, have relied on plea 
bargaining to dispose of cases.11 
But while plea bargaining continues to spread globally, its use remains 
highly controversial. Perhaps the greatest concern is that, at least as currently 
practiced in the United States, plea bargaining can be so coercive as to lead some 
innocent people to plead guilty.12 Broad prosecutorial discretion to set high plea 
discounts, combined with harsh baseline sentences, places significant pressure 
on defendants to take a plea. Data from the National Registry of Exonerations 
(NRE) support these concerns: As of January 2017, roughly 18% of recorded 
exonerations (343 out of 1,956) in the NRE were the product of guilty pleas.13 As 
discussed below, many more false guilty pleas likely remain unreported. 
Apart from its potential to coerce innocent defendants to plead guilty, the 
current practice of plea bargaining in the U.S. is criticized for conflicting with 
the search for truth. Even if defendants are guilty of some offense, incomplete 
investigations, inadequate disclosure, limited adversarial testing, perfunctory 
judicial oversight, and sizeable plea discounts can lead defendants to plead 
guilty to crimes different from the ones they committed. Some of the same 





10. See, e.g., JENIA IONTCHEVA TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS 1 (2009); Critics Hit 
Japan’s New Plea-Bargaining System, Say It Opens Door to False Testimony, JAPAN TIMES (May 29, 
2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/29/national/crime-legal/critics-hit-japans-
new-plea-bargaining-system-say-opens-door-false-testimony/#.WHL38FMrKM8. 
11. TURNER, supra note 10, at 213; Malian Jihadi To Plead Guilty in ICC Cultural Destruction 
Trial, THE GUARDIAN (May 24, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/may/24/malian-
jihadi-to-plead-guilty-forgiveness-icc-cultural-destruction-trial. 
12. See, e.g., Lucian E. Dervan, The Injustice of the Plea-Bargain System, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 
3, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-injustice-of-the-plea-bargain-system-1449188034; 
Tim Lynch, Americans Are Bargaining Away Their Innocence, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/01/20/americans-are-bargaining-away-
their-innocence/?utm_term=.e5b3744dffdb. For a discussion of wrongful convictions, see 
Brandon L. Garrett, “Actual Innocence and Wrongful Convictions,” in the present Volume.
13. Exoneration Detail List, NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx (last visited Jan. 4, 2017).
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disproportionately harsh. They also allow the negotiation of plea bargains 
that vary based on arbitrary factors such as race, “wealth, sex, age, education, 
intelligence, and confidence.”14
Plea bargaining is further criticized for reducing the fairness and legitimacy 
of the criminal justice system. When defendants plead guilty, they waive most 
procedural protections associated with a trial and opt for a non-transparent 
process with limited judicial review and little to no adversarial testing. The 
lack of transparency in plea bargaining impairs the legitimacy of the process 
in the eyes of not only defendants, but also victims and the general public.15 
Public attitudes toward plea bargaining are overwhelmingly negative, in large 
part because of the lack of transparency and the perception that it is allowing 
guilty defendants to get away with unduly lenient punishment.16
So far, courts and legislatures have taken a largely hands-off approach 
to plea bargaining, imposing few constraints on its operation.17 To address 
the serious concerns about the fairness and accuracy of the process, judges 
and policymakers ought to consider more comprehensive regulation. As 
subsequent sections discuss, regulation may range from small fixes, such as 
requiring that plea agreements be reduced to writing and placed on the record, 
to more significant reform, such as mandating broader pre-plea disclosure, 
more thorough judicial scrutiny of guilty pleas, and limits on plea discounts. 
Even more ambitiously, broader criminal justice reform—aimed at narrowing 
the scope of criminal codes, increasing judicial sentencing discretion, and 
providing better funding for prosecutors and defense attorneys alike—is also 
important for ensuring that plea bargaining functions in a fair manner.
14. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2468 
(2004); see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining (pt. 1), 76 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1059, 1125-26 (1976) (noting that plea bargaining is influenced by “a defense attorney’s 
charm, by past favors that he had rendered, by the extent of his friendship with prosecutors or trial 
judges, by the race, wealth or bail status of the defendant, by the unusual weight that a particular 
judge might choose to give to a defendant’s choice of plea, by a prosecutor’s mood or his desire 
to finish work early on an especially busy day, by the publicity that a case had generated, or by 
any of a number of other factors, irrelevant to the goals of the criminal process”). For discussions 
of the impact of race in adjudication and sentencing, see Paul Butler, “Race and Adjudication,” 
in the present Volume; and Cassia Spohn, “Race and Sentencing Disparity,” in Volume 4 of the 
present Report.
15. See, e.g., Gregory M. Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy, 48 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 143 (2011).
16. Sergio Herzog, Plea Bargaining Practices: Less Covert, More Public Support?, 50 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 590, 590-92 (2004).
17. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 5, at 91.
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I. PLEA-BARGAINING LAW AND POLICY
Despite its central place in criminal law practice, plea bargaining remains 
remarkably lightly regulated. The Supreme Court has imposed limited 
constraints grounded in the Due Process Clause, the privilege against self-
incrimination, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.18 Statutes and rules 
provide only minimal additional regulation.
In Brady v. United States, the Supreme Court held that because a guilty plea 
is a waiver of the right to trial, the Due Process Clause requires that the plea 
be voluntary and knowing.19 But in both Brady and subsequent decisions, the 
Court interpreted these requirements narrowly.
The Court held that the threat of a significantly more severe penalty (even 
the death penalty) upon conviction is not so coercive as to invalidate a guilty 
plea.20 Indeed, few governmental actions short of physical coercion would 
render a guilty plea involuntary.21 For example, neither threats to bring more 
serious charges against the defendant nor threats to charge family members 
have been held to constitute impermissible coercion, as long as the prosecutor 
has probable cause to support the charges.22
The requirement that a guilty plea be informed is also not particularly 
demanding. Judges must confirm that the defendant understands the essential 
elements of the crime to which he is pleading guilty.23 In most jurisdictions, 
rules of procedure and statutes further require judges to inform defendants 
of the direct consequences of a guilty plea24 and of rights waived by pleading 
18. For arguments that the Supreme Court should impose more stringent constitutional 
limits, see Russell D. Covey, Plea Bargaining After Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 595, 597, 599-
600 (2013); Richard L. Lippke, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Constitution, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 
709, 722-23 (2013). 
19. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
20. Id. at 755.
21. E.g., Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218-26 (1978); United States v. Carpenter, 25 
F. App’x. 337, 343-44 (6th Cir. 2001) (guilty plea was not involuntary even though it was part 
of a “package deal” under which the prosecution would refrain from seeking the death penalty 
only if both the defendant and his codefendant brother agreed to plead guilty); Miles v. Dorsey, 
61 F.3d 1459, 1468 (10th Cir. 1995). Certain rules and case law, however, presume that judicial 
participation in plea negotiations renders a subsequent guilty plea involuntary. E.g., State v. 
Bouie, 817 So. 2d 48, 53-54 (La. 2002); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1).
22. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 
1021-22 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
23. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 652-53 (1976).
24. E.g., United States v. Rivera-Maldonado, 560 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 2009); Jamison v. Klem, 
544 F.3d 266, 276-277 (3d Cir. 2008); 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.4(d) 
n.116 (4th ed. 2016).
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guilty.25 However, a guilty plea may be informed even when the prosecution 
fails to disclose evidence favorable to the defense.26 Likewise, judges need only 
give minimal notice of the meaning of the right to counsel before defendants 
waive that right at a plea hearing.27
And while federal and state criminal procedure rules generally require guilty 
pleas to be based on facts, the factual-basis standard remains quite vague.28 As a 
result, judges rarely go beyond reviewing the indictment and then confirming 
that the facts alleged comport with the defendant’s brief statement at the plea 
colloquy.29 Given this rather perfunctory factual inquiry, parties remain free to 
engage in fact bargaining and frequently do so.30 The Court has also allowed 
25. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 24, § 21.4(e) n.190. Some courts have held that a warning of 
the rights waived is required in order for the plea to be informed. See id. n.194; cf. Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (requiring a record of a knowing and voluntary waiver of 
rights inherent in guilty plea). 
26. Ruiz v. United States, 536 U.S. 622, 623 (2002) (holding that a guilty plea may be informed 
even when the prosecution has failed to disclose evidence that serves to impeach the credibility 
of prosecution witnesses). Ruiz concluded that the government is not constitutionally required 
to disclose impeachment evidence before a guilty plea, but it did not squarely resolve whether 
the government must disclose factually exculpatory evidence. Id. at 628. Circuit courts have split 
on this question. Compare, e.g., Orman v. Cain, 228 F.3d 616, 617 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
a prosecutor need not disclose exculpatory evidence when a defendant waives a trial and pleads 
guilty), with, e.g., McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787–88 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting 
that, if a prosecutor fails to disclose factually exculpatory evidence before a defendant enters a 
guilty plea, this would likely violate the Due Process Clause); see also Buffey v. Ballard, 2015 WL 
7103326, at *11 (W. Va. Nov. 10, 2015) (reviewing federal and state decisions on this question 
and concluding “that a defendant is constitutionally entitled to exculpatory evidence during the 
plea negotiation stage”).
27. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (holding that the court must inform the defendant 
“of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and 
of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea” but does not 
need to “(1) advise the defendant that ‘waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether 
to plead guilty [entails] the risk that a viable defense will be overlooked’; and (2) ‘admonis[h]’ 
the defendant ‘that by waiving his right to an attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain an 
independent opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty’”).
28. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 24, § 21.4(f).
29. Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 
54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 212-23 (2006); MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & SCOTT A. GILBERT, FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES: RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER’S 1996 
SURVEY 10 (1997), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/2017/gssurvey.pdf (reporting 
that 25% of judges stated that they have never “‘go[ne] behind’ a plea agreement and rule[d] 
against a prosecutor’s recommendation that tends to lower a sentence by either stipulating facts 
or recommending the application, or nonapplication, of specific offense characteristics” and 
that of the 75% who do “go behind plea agreements,” only about 8% do so “somewhat or very 
frequently”).
30. Turner, supra note 29, at 212-23.
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judges to accept guilty pleas even when defendants profess their innocence, as 
long as sufficient factual basis independently supports the conviction.31  
Courts have also failed to regulate the practice of charge bargaining in any 
meaningful way. They have interpreted separation-of-powers principles to 
prevent judges from interfering with prosecutors’ decisions to reduce or dismiss 
charges.32 Because decisions about charges have profound effects on sentencing 
(particularly in systems with mandatory minimums, recidivist enhancements, 
or sentencing guidelines),33 prosecutors can typically induce guilty pleas by 
offering favorable charging concessions to defendants.
The Supreme Court has also done little to ensure the transparency and 
reviewability of negotiated judgments. It has allowed the parties to waive 
the right to appeal—a practice that is now routine—and it has not required 
agreements to be reduced to writing or otherwise placed on the record.34 
Victims have no right to take part in the negotiations and in some jurisdictions 
are not even consulted about the possibility of resolving the case through a 
plea bargain.35 Plea negotiations thus remain opaque and largely immune from 
review in most U.S. jurisdictions.36
31. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970) (equivocal guilty pleas are acceptable 
when there is strong factual evidence supporting guilt). But cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. 
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-16.015, https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-16000-pleas-federal-
rule-criminal-procedure-11#9-16.015 (last updated Oct. 2016) (instructing federal prosecutors 
not to consent to Alford pleas “except in the most unusual of circumstances” and only after 
supervisory approval).
32. See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379-81 (2d Cir. 1973); 
United States v. Giannattasio, 979 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1992); cf. Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to 
Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1225, 1231 (2016) (critiquing this jurisprudence 
as “inconsistent with the history of criminal justice administration in many states”).
33. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a 
Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935, 1977 (2006) 
(finding that “charge bargaining over the offense seriousness is one of the central ways that 
cases are resolved” and that “these charge reductions have substantial effects on the severity of 
sentences imposed”).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Toth, 668 F.3d 374, 378 (2012); Keller v. United States, 657 F.3d 
675, 681 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Nancy King & Michael O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of 
Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 212 (2005) (“In nearly two-thirds of the cases settled by plea 
agreement in our sample, the defendant waived his right to review.”).
35. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 24, at § 21.3(f) (“Provisions on prosecutor/victim consultation 
… exist in about two-thirds of the states as well as on the federal level” and “a substantial 
minority of the states appear to authorize a victim to appear at [plea hearings] and to be heard 
on the matter.”); see also Cassell, supra note 8.
36. A few states have begun enacting rules requiring that plea offers be placed on the record. 
See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133, 146-47 (2012) (discussing Arizona and New Jersey rules 
requiring that plea offers be placed on the record).
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While otherwise taking a laissez-faire approach to plea bargaining, the Court 
has been more active in regulating defendants’ rights to effective assistance of 
counsel at the guilty-plea stage.37 The Court has held that defense counsel must 
advise defendants of certain significant consequences of pleading guilty, such 
as the possibility of deportation.38 It has also affirmed that counsel must relay 
to clients any plea offers made by prosecutors and must competently advise 
clients of the legal advantages and disadvantages of accepting an offer.39 But 
the court has yet to clarify the duties of defense counsel in preparation for 
and during plea negotiations, and it has not attempted to directly regulate 
prosecutorial conduct in the process.
II. PLEA-BARGAINING CRITIQUES
While a few commentators have defended plea bargaining on the grounds 
of its efficiency and ostensible benefits to the parties involved,40 most have been 
critical of the practice. In the 1980s, some called for outright abolition of plea 
bargaining.41 At this point, perhaps in recognition of the entrenched position 
of plea bargaining in the United States, scholarship has shifted focus toward 
correcting the worst excesses of the practice.42 Empirical research has also 
attempted to identify more systematically areas in need of reform. Scholars’ 
concerns fall into three principal categories: (1) the risk of coercion; (2) the 
risk of inaccuracy; and (3) insufficient procedural protections.
37. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170-72 (2012); 
Frye, 566 U.S. at 145-46.
38. Padilla, 559 U.S. 356.
39. Lafler, 566 U.S. 156; Frye, 566 U.S. at 145 (“As a general rule, defense counsel has the duty 
to communicate formal prosecution offers to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be 
favorable to the accused.”).
40. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969 (1992); 
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L. J. 1909, 1914-15, 1968 
(1992); Wilkinson, supra note 5; Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining 
in United States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717, 730 (2006) (offering a qualified defense of 
plea bargaining based on its “value in inducing defendants to cooperate in investigations of other 
suspects”). 
41. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives 
to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 1048 (1983); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea 
Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 2003-08 (1992).
42. Alschuler, supra note 5, at 706-07 (“[T]he time for a crusade to prohibit plea bargaining 
has passed. Instead, the time may have come for criminal justice scholars to abandon the search 
for ways to make the criminal justice system fair and principled. Their principal mission today 




Much has been written about the concern that excessive plea discounts may 
coerce defendants to plead guilty and unduly penalize those who choose to go 
to trial.43 This risk is particularly serious when steep discounts are combined 
with harsh baseline sentences.44 Together, these two features may induce even 
defendants with good odds of prevailing at trial to accept a plea bargain.
Since the 1980s, mandatory sentencing laws, sentencing guidelines, and the 
abolition of parole have led to a sharp rise in sentence length in most states and 
the federal system.45 Just as sentences have grown longer, rewards for pleading 
guilty have also increased.46 Some of these rewards are expressly granted by 
rules or statutes, such as reductions for accepting responsibility or cooperating 
with the prosecution. Others are offered indirectly, by giving prosecutors broad 
discretion to reduce charges for defendants who agree to plead guilty.47
43. See, e.g., id. at 678-81; Russell Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining With Plea-
Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1245 (2008); Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2346 (2006); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 3, 12 (1978); Maximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of 
Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 224-28 (2006); 
Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea Bargaining Reform, 49 
CRIM. L.Q. 67, 87-90 (2005); Ronald Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal 
Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 109 (2005).
44. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 40, at 718.
45. Turner, supra note 29, at 205; see also Cullen, supra note 9; Douglas A. Berman, “Sentencing 
Guidelines,” in Volume 4 of the present Report; Erik Luna, “Mandatory Minimums,” in Volume 
4 of the present Report. Even after the Federal Sentencing Guidelines became merely advisory, 
judges continue to follow the Guidelines in a large majority of cases. Paul J. Hofer, Has Booker 
Restored Balance? A Look at Data on Plea Bargaining and Sentencing, 23 FED. SENT’G. REP. 326, 
328-29 (2011). This leaves prosecutors with significant power to set the plea discount through 
charging decisions and motions for substantial assistance departures.
46. Andrew Chongseh Kim, Underestimating the Trial Penalty: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Federal Trial Penalty and Critique of the Abrams Study, 84 MISS. L.J. 1195, 1202 (2015) (finding that 
“federal defendants convicted at trial receive sentences that are sixty-four percent longer than similar 
defendants who plead guilty, excluding the effects of charge and fact bargaining”); Nancy J. King et al., 
When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial 
In Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 973-75, 992 (2005) (studying sentencing practices in 
five states and finding trial penalties ranging from 13 to 461%); McCoy, supra note 43, at 90 (finding 
an average trial penalty of 44.5 months in state felony cases); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AN OFFER YOU 
CAN’T REFUSE: HOW U.S. FEDERAL PROSECUTORS FORCE DRUG DEFENDANTS TO PLEAD GUILTY 102 (2013) 
(finding that average federal drug sentences in cases that went to trial were three times harsher than 
average sentences in cases that were resolved by a plea).
47. See, e.g., Wright & Engen, supra note 33, at 1948-50.
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Empirical studies suggest that innocent defendants are at the greatest risk 
of pleading guilty in four situations: (1) when there is a significant differential 
between the negotiated sentence and the sentence expected upon conviction 
after trial;48 (2) when the plea offer is to probation, while the expected sentence 
post-trial entails imprisonment;49 (3) when the plea offer is to imprisonment, 
while capital punishment is a possibility after trial; and (4) when the defendant 
is detained, and a guilty plea results in release for time served.50
48. E.g., Wright, supra note 43, at 84-86, 116-17, 147-48 (reviewing the increase of guilty plea 
rates and the decrease of acquittals in the federal system since the rise of mandatory sentencing 
and concluding that deep discounts for “acceptance of responsibility” and “substantial 
assistance” may have led defendants in the federal system to abandon meritorious trial defenses 
and plead guilty); Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: An 
Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1, 36 (2013) (in an experiment involving college students accused of cheating, finding that “well 
over half of the innocent study participants … were willing to falsely admit guilt in return for a 
reduced punishment”). Studies relying on self-reports by convicted offenders also offer qualified 
support for the proposition that the threat of harsher punishment after trial might induce some 
innocent defendants to plead guilty. Kenneth S. Bordens & John Basset, The Plea Bargaining 
Process from the Defendant’s Perspective: A Field Investigation, 6 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 93, 
109 (1985) (finding that convicted defendants had accepted plea bargains primarily in order to 
minimize punishment); Allison D. Redlich et al., Self-Reported False Confessions and False Guilty 
Pleas Among Offenders with Mental Illness, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 79, 88 (2010) (finding that 
37% of offenders with mental illness reported having tendered a false guilty plea at some point 
in their life, and nearly two-thirds of them stated that they did so to secure release from jail or a 
shorter sentence).
49. For example, a 1984 mock bargaining experiment involving college students found that in 
certain circumstances, particularly when conviction was seen as highly likely and probation was 
offered upon a guilty plea, “innocent” study subjects would accept a plea bargain “in order to cut 
their losses.” Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects of Likelihood of Conviction, Threatened Punishment, 
and Assumed Role on Mock Plea Bargaining Decisions, 5 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 59, 71 (1984).
50. After reviewing real cases of exonerees who had pleaded guilty, John Blume and Rebecca 
Helm identified a similar set of factors contributing to false guilty pleas. See John H. Blume 
& Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 
CORNELL L. REV. 157 (2014).
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For example, the most recent data reported by the National Registry of 
Exonerations show that roughly 18% of recorded exonerations (343 out 
of 1,956) were the product of guilty pleas.51 The NRE identified large plea 
discounts as a key factor driving false guilty pleas.52 Other analyses of plea-
based exonerations have similarly found that innocent defendants plead guilty 
to avoid the risk of harsher punishment after trial.53
Certain types of plea discounts appear to be especially coercive. The plea 
discount that Brady claimed had induced him to plead guilty—the threat of 
receiving the death penalty if convicted after trial—is an important example. 
A recent study of capital charging and sentencing decisions in Georgia in the 
period between 1993 and 2000 found “strong evidence that the threat of the 
death penalty ha[d] a robust causal effect on the likelihood of a plea agreement.”54 
The threat of the death penalty was found to increase the probability of a guilty 
plea by roughly 20% to 25%.55 While the study did not reach any conclusions 
about the effects of the death-penalty threat on innocent defendants, other 
studies have documented cases in which innocents have pleaded guilty to avoid 
the death penalty.56 As the NRE noted, “[e]xcluding drug cases, most guilty-plea 
exonerations are for homicide or sexual assault, two categories that account for 




51. Exoneration Detail List, NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx (last visited Jan. 4, 2017). Of these exonerations based 
on guilty pleas, 50.1% (172/343) were for drug offenses, and most of these came from one 
county—Harris County, Texas—where they were uncovered as a result of the work of the Harris 
County D.A.’s Office Conviction Integrity Unit. Id.; Innocents Who Plead Guilty, NAT’L REGISTRY 
OF EXONERATIONS, (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/
NRE.Guilty.Plea.Article1.pdf [hereinafter Innocents Who Plead Guilty]. For a discussion of some 
of the reasons why exoneration data might underrepresent the prevalence of false guilty pleas, 
see Dervan & Edkins, supra note 48, at 21-22. See generally Garrett, supra note 12.
52. Innocents Who Plead Guilty, supra note 51; see also Blume & Helm, supra note 50, at 180.
53. Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful Convictions, 90 WASH. U.L. REV. 
1133, 1173 (2013) (examining the mass exonerations in the Rampart case in California and the 
Tulia case in Texas and finding that, in those two cases involving police misconduct, innocent 
defendants pleaded guilty at a rate of 77%).
54. Sherod Thaxton, Leveraging Death, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 475, 475 (2013). For a 
discussion of the death penalty, see Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, “Capital Punishment,” 
in Volume 4 of the present Report.
55. Thaxton, supra note 54, at 475.
56. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 523, 544-46 (2005); Innocents Who Plead Guilty, supra note 51.
57. Innocents Who Plead Guilty, supra note 51, at 2.
Plea Bargaining 83
fourths were convicted of homicide, and “[i]t appears that the great majority 
[pleaded guilty] to avoid the risk of execution. All but 2 were prosecuted in death 
penalty states, and 70% had falsely confessed (31/44).”58
On the other side of the punishment spectrum, a plea offer of time served 
for detained defendants has also been found to lead innocent defendants to 
plead guilty. Misdemeanor defendants are frequently detained for the simple 
reason that they cannot afford to post bail, and they are commonly offered 
plea deals to “time served.”59 They are then subject to significant economic and 
familial pressures to plead guilty in order to be released from jail. A recent 
empirical study found that misdemeanor detainees “plead guilty at a 25% 
higher rate than similarly situated releasees.”60 The authors concluded that 
“[m]isdemeanor pretrial detention … seems especially likely to induce guilty 
pleas, including wrongful ones.” 61
B. INACCURACY
Apart from coercive plea discounts, several other plea-bargaining features 
heighten the risk of inaccurate and unjust outcomes: (1) limited time and 
resources for investigations, especially by the defense; (2) principal-agent 
problems on both the defense and prosecution sides; and (3) insufficient 
judicial review. These flaws increase the risk that defendants may plead guilty 
to inaccurate charges or receive punishment that is undeservedly lenient or 
undeservedly harsh.
In theory, if the prosecution attempts to pressure a defendant into a guilty 
plea despite weak evidence of guilt, the defense attorney could advise the client 
to reject the plea offer. In practice, counsel is frequently unable to do so because 
of overwhelming caseloads, cuts in indigent-defense funding, and rules that 
limit defense investigations.62 Defense attorneys lack search and subpoena 
58. Id. at 3; see also Blume & Helm, supra note 50, at 180 (identifying the threat of the death 
penalty as a factor in pushing innocent defendants to plead guilty).
59. Paul S. Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 
69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 715 (2017); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1322 
(2012) [hereinafter Natapoff Article]; see also Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, “Pretrial 
Detention and Bail,” in the present Volume; Alexandra Natapoff, “Misdemeanors,” in Volume 1 
of the present Report.
60. Heaton et al., supra note 59, at 747.
61. Id. at 716; Natapoff Article, supra note 59, at 1347.
62. Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal 
Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1590 (2005); see also Eve Brensike Primus, “Defense Counsel 
and Public Defense,” in the present Volume.
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powers and the authority to depose witnesses.63  Pre-plea discovery is also 
limited; for example, prosecutors are not constitutionally required to disclose 
impeachment evidence, which could greatly help the defense uncover flaws in 
the government’s case.64 Some courts have even held that prosecutors need not 
disclose factually exculpatory evidence before a guilty plea.65 While state rules 
may mandate more robust disclosure, such mandates often apply before trial, 
but not before a plea.
Various incentives for the defendant to plead guilty as early as possible 
further discourage thorough defense investigation.66 Charging and sentencing 
concessions are frequently predicated on timely “acceptance of responsibility.”67 
When defendants are presented with “exploding offers,” defense attorneys are 
left with scant opportunity to investigate the case.68
Agency problems also affect prosecutors’ and defense attorneys’ actions in 
plea negotiations. When defense attorneys carry heavy caseloads or are paid flat 
fees, they have an incentive to settle cases quickly even when their clients might 
prefer to test the case at trial or when a more thorough investigation might 
uncover viable defenses or mitigating factors.69 On the flip side, prosecutors 
dealing with high caseloads may negotiate overly generous plea bargains to 
dispose of a case more swiftly.70 This risk is heightened because victims have 
little to no input into prosecutorial decisions during plea bargaining.
63. See Brown, supra note 62, at 1601. But see FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a)(1)(ii) (providing for 
pretrial depositions by the defense).
64. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 623 (2002).
65. Orman v. Cain, 228 F.3d 616, 617 (5th Cir. 2000); Walton v. State, 165 So. 3d 516, 525 
(Miss. Ct. App. 2015).
66. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-27.420, https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-
principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.420 (last updated Jan. 2017) (prosecutors “should make 
clear to defense counsel at an early stage in the proceedings that, if there are to be any plea 
discussions, they must be concluded prior to a certain date, and well in advance of the trial date”) 
(emphasis added). For a discussion of evidentiary disclosure, see Darryl K. Brown, “Discovery,” 
in the present Volume.
67. E.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E.1.1 cmt., app. 1 (2016); id. § 6B1.2 cmt.
68. Tina M. Zottoli et al., Plea Discounts, Time Pressures, and False-Guilty Pleas in Youth and 
Adults Who Pleaded Guilty to Felonies in New York City, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 250, 251 
(2016) (“Anecdotal data abound to suggest that prosecutors (and sometime judges) attach very 
stringent time constraints on defendants, such that defense attorneys have little to no time to vet 
evidence or investigate cases.”).
69. Alschuler, supra note 5, at 682; Bibas, supra note 14, at 2477.
70. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 51 
(1968); Bibas, supra note 14, at 2474.
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In theory, judges could provide a neutral check on the parties and ensure 
that bargaining decisions are consistent with the facts of the case. But in reality, 
the law provides judges few tools to do so, and judges rarely make use of the 
powers they do have to check plea bargains. As discussed earlier, the factual-
basis inquiry remains rather perfunctory, and fact bargaining is common.71 
Furthermore, in many jurisdictions, judges are prohibited from participating 
in or commenting on the plea negotiations.72 Yet it is precisely during the 
negotiations that judges are likely to have the greatest impact on the fairness 
and accuracy of the outcome. Once the parties have arrived at a deal, they 
have little incentive to reveal anything that might disturb the agreement. The 
judge’s inquiry into the facts at the plea hearing is therefore unlikely to unearth 
discrepancies that place the deal in jeopardy. 
As a result, plea bargains often fail to fully reflect the facts of the case. 
Negotiated charges may allege a crime that is more serious, less serious, or 
simply quite different from the actual conduct of the defendant. Similarly, 
because of the lack of publicity and adequate judicial checks on plea bargaining, 
a defendant who pleads guilty may get a sentence that does not accurately 
reflect his guilt. For example, a defendant may receive a harsher sentence 
than deserved, based on arbitrary factors such as race, gender, age, wealth, or 
the relationship between defense counsel and the prosecutor.73 Conversely, 
a defendant may get a sentence that is undeservedly mild if a prosecutor is 
too overworked or if the factors mentioned above bias prosecutors in favor of 
leniency.74 In the rush to dispose of the case, without adequate judicial scrutiny 
or publicity, the parties can settle for bargains that depart from the “shadow of 
trial” and from the truth.75
C. INADEQUATE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
Another failing of plea bargaining is its opaqueness. The parties negotiate 
the disposition in private, typically without the participation of a neutral third 
party or direct input from victims. Plea bargains are rarely written or recorded 
in any fashion. The lack of record and transparency hinders accountability 
71. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
72. E.g., State v. Bouie, 817 So. 2d 48, 53-54 (La. 2002); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1); Turner, supra 
note 29, at 202 & n.6 (listing jurisdictions).
73. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; Besiki Luka Kutateladze et al., Opening Pandora’s 
Box: How Does Defendant Race Influence Plea Bargaining?, 33 JUSTICE Q. 398, 420 (2016); Cassia 
Spohn & Robert Fornango, U.S. Attorneys and Substantial Assistance Departures: Testing for 
Interprosecutor Disparity, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 813, 835-36 (2009).
74. E.g., Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World of Bargained 
Punishment, 58 STAN. L. REV. 293, 297 (2005); Turner, supra note 29, at 259.
75. See, e.g., RICHARD LIPPKE, ETHICS OF PLEA BARGAINING ch. 9 (2011).
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for flaws in the process or the outcome. It also taints the process in the eyes 
of the public and victims.76 Public rates of disapproval of plea bargaining are 
strikingly high, at least in part because of the covert nature of the practice.77 
The lack of a clear record also makes empirical research into plea bargaining 
difficult and frustrates scholars who aim to offer data-based analysis.78
In addition to lacking transparency, plea bargains increasingly require 
defendants to waive important procedural rights that are designed to ensure 
fair and accurate outcomes. Inherent in a guilty plea are waivers of the right 
to remain silent, the right to confront witnesses, the right to a public trial, and 
the right to a jury trial. Increasingly, however, as part of plea negotiations, 
prosecutors regularly demand waivers of critical additional rights. These 
include the following rights: to appeal the validity of the plea and associated 
sentence;79 to discovery (including discovery of exculpatory evidence);80  to 
post-conviction DNA testing;81 to have a pre-sentence investigation and report 
prepared;82 and to challenge ineffective counsel.83 These types of waivers insulate 
plea bargains from judicial review, thus allowing prosecutorial overreaching 
76. Bibas, supra note 14, at 2547; Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 
42 GA. L. REV. 407, 444-46 (2008). 
77. Herzog, supra note 16, at 591.
78. Brian D. Johnson et al., Sociolegal Approaches to the Study of Guilty Pleas and Prosecution, 
12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 481-82 (2016). For a notable example of a state statute requiring a 
record, for purposes of maintaining statistics, of the sentencing and charging concessions made 
in exchange for a guilty plea, see KY. REV. STAT. § 27A.420.
79. Paul J. Hofer, Has Booker Restored Balance? A Look at Data on Plea Bargaining and 
Sentencing, 23 FED. SENT’G. REP. 326, 327-28 (2011); Nancy King & Michael O’Neill, Appeal 
Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L. J. 209, 212 (2005) (finding that “in nearly 
two-thirds of the cases settled by plea agreement [in the federal system], the defendants waived 
their rights to review”). See generally Nancy J. King, “Criminal Appeals,” in the present Volume.
80. Hofer, supra note 45, at 327-28; Susan R. Klein et al., Waiving the Criminal Justice System: 
An Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 77 (2015); see also Brown, supra 
note 6. 
81. Klein et al., supra note 80, at 83; see also Garrett, supra note 12.
82. Hofer, supra note 45, at 327-28 (in districts with “fast-track programs … defendants, 
in order to avoid excessive punishments, are required to waive their rights to indictment, to 
discovery of the evidence against them, to have a pre-sentence investigation and report prepared, 
to argue for a reduced sentence before the judge, and to appeal a mistaken sentence”).
83. Klein et al., supra note 80, at 88.
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and other procedural failures and factual inaccuracies to remain unchecked.84 
They are also arguably uninformed, as most defendants cannot adequately 
understand some of the claims they are waiving.85 While some people defend 
such waivers on the grounds that defendants should have the freedom to 
exchange their rights for shorter sentences, these arguments underestimate the 
long-term damage to the integrity of the system that widespread waivers of 
critical rights can inflict.
III. REFORM PROPOSALS
The increasing number of exonerations of people who pleaded guilty has 
revived interest in proposals to reform plea bargaining. These range from 
complete abolition to discrete doctrinal fixes.86
A. REDUCING COERCION
One set of proposals aims to reduce the coerciveness of plea bargaining by 
limiting the size of plea discounts. Proposals include setting a fixed plea discount 
(e.g., one-third of the anticipated post-trial sentence), enacting caps on plea 
84. As one court explained about negotiated waivers of the right to appeal the sentence: 
The condition sought to be imposed by the government is inherently unfair; 
… it will undermine the error correcting function of the courts of appeals in 
sentencing; it will create a sentencing regime where courts of appeals will never 
have the opportunity to review an illegal or unconstitutional sentence, or a 
sentence that has no basis in fact, unless those sentencing errors work to the 
disadvantage of the government.... A defendant cannot knowingly, intelligently 
and voluntarily give up the right to appeal a sentence that has not yet been 
imposed and about which the defendant has no knowledge as to what will occur 
at the time of sentencing.
United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 49 (D.D.C. 1997); see also Klein et al., supra note 80, 
at 114 (“[Waivers of ineffective assistance claims] remove the ‘only remaining “checks’ in our 
system of plea-agreement justice. If the defendant is allowed to give up this right at the plea 
stage, there is little cushion left to protect her against unwise tactical decisions, prosecutorial 
misconduct or overzealousness, or waiver of important other rights.”).
85. Klein et al., supra note 80, at 107-08; Ellen S. Podgor, Pleading Blindly, 80 MISS. L.J. 1633, 
1641 (2011) (noting ethical and legal concerns with discovery waivers).
86. For a sampling of recent reform proposals by policy organizations, judges and legislators, 
see FAIR TRIALS, COMMUNIQUÉ—A FAIR DEAL: NEGOTIATING JUSTICE (2015), https://www.fairtrials.
org/wp-content/uploads/Final-Washington-Plea-Bargain-roundtable-communique.pdf; Ted 
Cruz, Reduce Federal Crimes and Give Judges Flexibility, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 27, 2015), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/reduce-federal-crimes-and-give-judges-flexibility; 
Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.
nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/nov/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/; American 




discounts (e.g., no more than one-third of the anticipated post-trial sentence), 
setting a limit on the “trial penalty” that courts might impose, or giving courts 
the power to review whether plea discounts are proportionate to the expected 
post-trial sentence.87 Such limits exist—and appear to work fairly successfully—
in foreign jurisdictions that have adopted forms of plea bargaining.88 But they are 
typically embedded in legal regimes that give judges broader sentencing discretion 
and greater authority to amend charges.89 By contrast, U.S. jurisdictions that have 
to impose limits on plea discounts have been less successful because prosecutors 
have been able to circumvent such limits through their charging decisions.90 To 
ensure that plea-discount limits are effective, therefore, legislators must adopt 
87. Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2313-17 (2006); 
McCoy, supra note 43, at 103; see also Covey, supra note 18, at 622 (proposing limits on the trial 
penalty rather than on the plea proposed by the prosecutor).
88. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES COUNCIL, REDUCTION IN SENTENCE FOR A GUILTY PLEA: DEFINITIVE 
GUIDELINE (rev. 2007), https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Reduction_
in_Sentence_for_a_Guilty_Plea_-Revised_20071.pdf (setting a recommended sentence 
reduction of one-third when a guilty plea is entered at the earliest reasonable opportunity and 
less if entered later); Julian V. Roberts & Ben Bradford, Sentence Reductions for a Guilty Plea in 
England and Wales: Exploring New Empirical Trends, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 187, 196 (2015) 
(finding that “almost all cases where a plea was entered attracted reductions of one-third or 
less”); Turner, supra note 29, at 235 (discussing how German courts are required to ensure that 
post-plea as well as post-trial sentences remain proportionate to the offense committed and how 
plea discounts tend not to exceed one-third of the anticipated post-trial sentence); C.P.P. art. 444 
(Italy), cited in William T. Pizzi & Mariangela Montagna, The Battle to Establish an Adversarial 
Trial System in Italy, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 429, 466 (2004) (setting the plea discount to one-third 
of the maximum sentence to be imposed post-trial in Italian criminal cases).
89. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 5, at 108 (observing that English constraints on prosecutorial 
discretion “are less rigorous, but still somewhat greater than in the United States”); Giulio 
Illuminati, The Accusatorial Process from the Italian Point of View, 35 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 297, 318 (2010) (arguing that although Italy has introduced a form of plea bargaining, 
“the principle of compulsory prosecution prevents a real out-of-court settlement between the 
defendant and the prosecution. Compulsory prosecution requires, in all cases, an evaluation 
on the merits by a judge and a monitoring on the content of the agreement, in accordance 
with the legality principle.”); Turner, supra note 29, at 219-20, 225-32 (describing the extensive 
involvement in plea negotiations by German judges for the purpose of controlling prosecutorial 
discretion and ensuring a proportionate sentence and an accurate outcome).
90. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, The Unusual Man in the Usual Place, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 
260, 274 (2009) (noting that although a New York statute, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.10, 
imposed caps on the size of post-indictment charge bargains, the parties would evade the limits 
by entering into pre-indictment plea agreements); Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, 
German Lay Judges, and the Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547, 601 (1997) (“As the 
experience with the federal sentencing guidelines makes clear, merely introducing a moderate 
and standard plea discount, without simultaneously controlling the prosecutorial charging 
decision, does little to constrain prosecutorial bargaining power or to prevent rampant charge 
and fact bargaining.”).
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them alongside more comprehensive reform of the criminal justice system, 
which would include restoring judicial discretion over sentencing and limiting 
prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions.91
Some have also argued that to reduce coerciveness in plea bargaining, 
courts and legislators should reject the Supreme Court’s hands-off approach to 
prosecutorial threats to overcharge defendants who refuse a plea offer. Instead, 
rules could require prosecutors to provide justification for adding charges 
later in the process and perhaps require new evidence for such additions.92 
In a number of states, courts acting “in the interests of justice” may be able 
to dismiss charges that were added by prosecutors solely to induce a plea 
bargain.93 As an alternative, some scholars have called on prosecutors’ offices to 
develop protocols that require line prosecutors to “refrain from pressure tactics 
like exploding offers and charging threats.”94
B. IMPROVING ACCURACY
Other reform proposals have focused on enhancing the accuracy of plea 
bargains. One critical step toward ensuring well-informed plea bargains would 
be a requirement of broad pre-plea discovery.95 A number of states have already 
adopted liberal discovery rules, and more are likely to follow suit in the near 
future.96 If enacted with due care to protect witness safety, discovery reform 
would come at little cost, while making an important contribution to the 
accuracy of plea bargains.97
91. See, e.g., John F. Pfaff, “Prosecutorial Guidelines,” in the present Volume; Luna, supra note 45.
92. BROWN, supra note 5, at 102 (discussing pre-Bordenkircher cases that constrained 
prosecutorial charging threats).
93. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385(a); Valena E. Beety, Judicial Dismissal in the Interest of Justice, 
80 MO. L. REV. 629, 647 (2015) (discussing state statutes that provide for judicial dismissal of 
charges in the interest of justice).
94. O’Hear, supra note 76, at 431; see also United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 422 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The Attorney General needs to expressly prohibit the use of prior felony 
information to coerce defendants into pleading guilty or to punish those who refuse to do so.”).
95. See, e.g., Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal 
Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285 (2016) (discussing scholarship 
advocating for broader pre-plea discovery); Brown, supra note 66.
96. For a list of key features of state and federal discovery rules, see Turner & Redlich, supra 
note 95, at 400.
97. Id. at 352-72 (reporting the views of North Carolina prosecutors and defense attorneys 
on the advantages and disadvantages of open-file discovery in their state).
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At the same time, for broad discovery to provide its intended benefits, it must 
be accompanied by provisions for well-funded defense.98 Defense attorneys 
must have the time and resources to review, analyze, and further investigate 
facts disclosed by the prosecution.
Judicial oversight of plea bargains can also increase the truthfulness of the 
process. This could be accomplished by involving judges in the negotiations99 or 
by demanding a more thorough inquiry into the factual basis of the guilty plea.100
Most states already require judges to ensure that guilty pleas are factually 
based.101 At a minimum, reform aimed at ensuring accurate guilty pleas 
must include this basic rule;102 preferably, the rule would also delineate how 
searching the inquiry should be. In the United States, perhaps the most robust 
factual-basis inquiry occurs in the military justice system; it can serve as a 
model for states wishing to provide greater judicial oversight over the guilty-
plea process.103 Military judges must engage the accused in a “dialogue in which 
the military judge poses questions about the offense and the accused provides 
answers that describe his personal understanding of the criminality of his or 








98. See, e.g., Ben Grunwald, The Fragile Promise of Open File Discovery, 49 CONN. L. REV. *1, *5 
(forthcoming); Primus, supra note 62.
99. Alschuler, supra note 14, at 1060; Turner, supra note 29; Rakoff, supra note 86; American 
Prosecutors Have Too Much Power, supra note 86.
100. E.g., BROWN, supra note 5, at 110; Susan R. Klein, Monitoring the Plea Process, 51 DUQ. L. 
REV. 559 (2013).
101. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 24, § 21.4 nn.205-06.
102. SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
IN OHIO COURTS (2016), http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/ruleamendments/documents/
Public%20Comment--2016%20Rules%20of%20Practice%20and%20Procedure%20
proposed%20amendments.pdf (proposing the adoption of a factual basis requirement for guilty 
pleas in Ohio).
103. Continental European systems also typically require the court, as part of its duty to 
investigate the truth, to conduct a searching inquiry into the facts underlying a plea agreement or 
guilty plea. E.g., Stephen C. Thaman, A Typology of Consensual Criminal Procedures: An Historical 
and Comparative Perspective on the Theory and Practice of Avoiding the Full Criminal Trial, in 
WORLD PLEA BARGAINING 297, 368 (Stephen C. Thaman ed., 2010).
104. United States v. Hartman, 69 M.J. 467, 469 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
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true facts, and judges are not supposed to ask leading questions that produce 
simple “yes” and “no” responses.105 Judges may also reject the guilty plea if the 
evidence presented at the hearing is inconsistent.106
Another way to enhance the accuracy of plea bargains would be to allow judges to 
participate in the negotiations. Judicial participation provides a neutral assessment of 
the facts at a point when such assessment can still make a difference; it minimizes the 
risks of coercion by prosecutors; and it provides the parties with early certainty about 
the sentencing outcome of a plea-bargained case. Such involvement also entails some 
risks—undermining the perceived neutrality of the judge or pressuring the parties to 
settle in order to expedite dispositions.107 But states can adopt procedural safeguards 
that address these problems—for example, by requiring, as Connecticut and 
Maryland do, that a different judge preside over a trial should the plea negotiations 
falter.108 Interviews with practitioners in states that permit judicial participation in 
plea negotiations suggest that, on the whole, judicial involvement tends to produce 
more-informed and fairer plea bargains.109 Experimental studies and public surveys 
further suggest that involving judges in the process is likely to enhance public 
perceptions of the legitimacy of plea bargaining.110
105. United States v. Negron, 60 M.J. 136, 143 (C.A.A.F. 2004), aff ’d, 64 M.J. 439 (C.A.A.F. 
Feb. 21, 2007) (“We have repeatedly advised against and cautioned judges regarding the use of 
conclusions and leading questions that merely extract from an accused ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses 
during the providency inquiry.”).
106. E.g., United States v. Pinero, 60 M.J. 31, 34 (C.A.A.F. 2004); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 
UNITED STATES, app. 8 (2012) (“The military judge should be alert to discrepancies in the accused’s 
description or between the accused’s description and any stipulation. If the accused’s discussion 
or other information discloses a possible defense, the military judge must inquire into the matter, 
and may not accept the plea if a possible defense exists. The military judge should explain to the 
accused the elements of a defense when the accused’s description raises the possibility of one.”).
107. Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining: Managerial 
Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 359-64 (2016) (noting that 
concern about managing cases more efficiently is a key factor motivating judicial participation 
in plea negotiations); Turner, supra note 29, at 202-04 (discussing concerns about judicial 
participation in plea negotiations).
108. MD. R. 4–243(c)(5) (“If the defendant withdraws the plea and pleads not guilty, then 
upon the objection of the defendant or the State made at that time, the judge to whom the 
agreement was presented may not preside at a subsequent court trial of the defendant on any 
charges involved in the rejected plea agreement.”); State v. D’Antonio, 830 A.2d 1187, 1194 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
109. King & Wright, supra note 107, at 364-81; Turner, supra note 29, at 252-56.
110. See, e.g., Herzog, supra note 16, at 593, 606 (discussing surveys of Canadian citizens and 
experimental study involving Israeli citizens).
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Finally, prosecutors’ offices can take measures to improve the accuracy of 
plea bargaining. Specifically, chief prosecutors can adopt internal guidelines that 
prohibit plea bargaining in so-called “half-baked cases.”111 Instead of bargaining 
away cases with weak evidence, prosecutors could be encouraged to either screen 
out such cases or bring them to trial. It is precisely in cases with weak evidence 
that defendants are most likely to be innocent and yet prosecutors are most likely 
to grant enormous plea discounts to induce a plea. To reduce the risk of wrongful 
convictions, prosecutors could refrain from bargaining in such cases.
C. ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY AND FAIRNESS
Other proposed reforms of plea bargaining focus on increasing transparency 
and procedural fairness. One such proposal would require that plea agreements 
be written and placed on the record. The written agreements would contain a 
clear statement of the key expected sentencing and collateral consequences. 
A few jurisdictions have already adopted such rules.112 They aim to protect 
defendants from uninformed guilty pleas and from basing the decision to plead 
guilty “upon certain promises made by the prosecutor where the judge has in 
fact not accepted the state’s recommendation.”113 While seemingly adding an 
onerous layer of documentation, such requirements can also “help prevent 
the possibility of disputes concerning the specific terms of a plea bargain” and 
prevent spurious claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.114 Furthermore, 
they provide a measure of transparency that protects the interests of victims 
and the public in understanding the terms of the bargain.
111. See, e.g., RICHARD LIPPKE, ETHICS OF PLEA BARGAINING ch. 8 (2011) (arguing that “officials 
committed to principled prosecution would be reluctant to engage in half-loaf plea bargaining,” 
i.e., plea bargaining to obtain conviction in cases with weak evidence); Welsh, supra note 6, at 
442-43 (discussing such policies in the Philadelphia D.A.’s Office, but noting that actual practice 
differed somewhat from office policy); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining 
Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 117 (2002) (holding up as an example the New Orleans D.A.’s Office, 
which relied on internal prosecutorial guidelines to get prosecutors to screen out, rather than 
bargain away weak cases).
112. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-35-3-3 (providing that plea agreements in felony cases must 
be in writing to be accepted by the court); MD. R. 4-243(d); N.J. CT. R. 3:9-1(b) (“Any plea offer 
to be made by the prosecutor shall be in writing and forwarded to the defendant’s attorney.”).
113. Davis v. State, 418 N.E.2d 256, 260 (Ind. App. 1981).
114. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408-09 (2012); 16A IND. PRAC., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE—
TRIAL § 13.3; see also Joel Mallard, Comment, Putting Plea Bargaining on the Record, 162 U. PA. 
L. REV. 683, 685 (2014); Stephanie Stern, Regulating the New Gold Standard of Criminal Justice: 
Confronting the Lack of Record-Keeping in the American Criminal Justice System, 52 HARV. J. LEGIS. 
245, 250-51 (2015). To promote transparency in plea bargaining, the German Constitutional 
Court has held that trial courts must record the existence, substance, and outcome of any plea 
negotiations and must not accept negotiated appeals waivers. Thomas Weigend & Jenia I. Turner, 
The Constitutionality of Negotiated Criminal Judgments in Germany, 15 GERMAN L.J. 81 (2014).
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To strengthen the fairness of plea bargaining, courts and legislatures can 
also impose limits on permissible waivers. These include limits or outright 
bans on: waivers of the right to appeal the plea and accompanying sentence; 
waivers of ineffective assistance of counsel claims; waivers of post-conviction 
DNA testing; and waivers of discovery rights.115 Such waivers are becoming 
more widespread in the federal system, but are less common and in some 
instances expressly prohibited in state systems, as violations of public policy or 
of professional responsibility rules.116
Finally, commentators have proposed alternatives to current forms of 
plea bargaining that expedite proceedings, but at a lesser cost to procedural 
fairness. Some have suggested that bench trials (possibly with simplified rules 
of procedure) would be a fairer, yet sufficiently expeditious and cost-effective 
alternative to plea bargaining.117 Others have gone further, proposing that the 
parties negotiate away certain trial procedures, but still retain the basic form 
of a trial as a substitute for plea bargaining.118 One commentator has proposed 
a plea jury, which would examine the validity of a guilty plea to ensure that 
it is voluntary, knowing, and factually based.119 These alternatives have been 
criticized by some for not offering the same demanding process that trials do.120 
But in a system where trials are the rare exception, abbreviated bench trials 
and jury plea hearings can be defended as superior alternatives to the norm of 
procedurally deficient plea bargains.
115. E.g., Klein et al., supra note 80, at 94, 114; FAIR TRIALS, supra note 86.
116. See, e.g., People v. Stevenson, 231 N.W.2d 476, 477 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that 
negotiated waivers of the right to appeal are against public policy); Ala. State Bar Office of 
Gen. Counsel, Op. 02, at 1, 4 (2011), https://www.alabar.org/assets/uploads/2014/08/2011-02.
pdf (opining that prosecutors and defense attorneys seeking to negotiate waivers of ineffective 
assistance claims would violate the state’s rules of professional responsibility); see also Klein, 
supra note 100, at 582-83; Turner & Redlich, supra note 95, at 346-52 (finding that waivers of 
discovery rights are rarely negotiated in Virginia and North Carolina).
117. Alschuler, supra note 41, at 1033 (“Since bench trials can be completed in a matter of 
minutes, they serve substantially the same purpose as guilty pleas.”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is 
Plea Bargaining Inevitable? 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1037 (1984) (“[B]ench trials can be … genuine 
adversary proceedings in which defendants retain many of the constitutional protections that 
plea bargaining sacrifices.”).
118. Gregory Gilchrist, Trial Bargaining, 101 IOWA L. REV. 609, 621 (2016) (“Trials could be 
streamlined through various waivers, while maintaining the legitimizing effect of jury verdicts.”).
119. Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 INDIANA L. J. 731, 733 (2010) (arguing that a plea jury 
would return the community to its traditional role in deciding guilt and punishment in criminal 
cases, enhance the procedural rights of defendants, strengthen the inquiry into the factual basis 
of the plea, add transparency to the process, and reduce prosecutorial power in plea bargaining).
120. E.g., Scott & Stuntz, supra note 40, at 1950.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Most of the above proposals address distinct problematic aspects of plea 
bargaining. They ought to be considered for adoption not in isolation, but 
as part of a comprehensive package that aims to ensure that plea bargaining 
produces just and accurate outcomes.
1. Require written plea agreements. Perhaps the easiest plea-bargaining 
reform for legislators to undertake is requiring that plea agreements be 
placed in writing and entered into the record. As noted earlier, several 
jurisdictions have already adopted such requirements. They help ensure 
that defendants receive notice of the terms of the agreement, allow for 
a more informed judicial review of the plea, and make the process more 
transparent to the public.
The California Judicial Council has created a plea form that lists a number 
of direct and collateral consequences that might follow a guilty plea and 
invites the parties to identify which of these consequences apply to their 
case. It also outlines rights that the defendant is waiving by pleading guilty 
and provides space for the parties to list other terms of the agreement. 
This form can serve as a blueprint for other jurisdictions.121 
With respect to placing plea agreements on the record, the Maryland 
rule offers a good model: “All proceedings pursuant to this Rule, 
including the defendant’s pleading, advice by the court, and inquiry 
into the voluntariness of the plea or a plea agreement shall be on the 
record. If the parties stipulate to the court that disclosure of the plea 
agreement or any of its terms would cause a substantial risk to any 
person of physical harm, intimidation, bribery, economic reprisal, or 
unnecessary annoyance or embarrassment, the court may order that the 
record be sealed subject to terms it deems appropriate.”122 In cases where 
cooperating defendants might frequently be subject to retaliation (e.g., 
organized-crime cases), the recording requirement may be modified or 
 
 
121. See California Courts, Plea Form, With Explanations and Waiver of Rights—Felony, http://
www.courts.ca.gov/documents/cr101.pdf. For a discussion of collateral consequences, see 
Gabriel J. Chin, “Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction,” in Volume 4 of the present 
Report.
122. MD. R. 4-243(d); see also State v. Poole, 583 A.2d 265 (Md. 1991) (holding that while 
the rule does not require that bench conferences relating to plea agreement be recorded, judges 
should make a record of pertinent discussion and decisions reached or at least summarize 
essential parts of the agreement).  
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even eliminated. The federal system is currently studying options for 
balancing these interests in cases where the safety of cooperating witnesses 
might be compromised.123
2. Prohibit waivers of critical rights. Courts or legislatures should prohibit 
the parties from negotiating waivers of several key rights that help protect 
the fairness and accuracy of plea bargains—the right to appeal the validity 
of the guilty plea and the accompanying sentence, the right to discovery, 
the right to subsequent DNA testing, and the right to effective assistance. 
Some jurisdictions already restrict or prohibit such waivers, but there is 
a troubling increase in the waivers negotiated in other systems, especially 
the federal system. These waivers undermine critical protections against 
uninformed and unfair plea bargains. To restore a measure of due process 
in plea bargaining, it is critical to prohibit their use by statute, case law 
or ethical rules.124 At the very least, prosecutor’s offices ought to restrict 
the negotiation of such waivers except in special circumstances requiring 
supervisory approval.
3. Provide broad pre-plea discovery and ensure that defense attorneys 
have the time and resources to review it. To ensure that innocent 
defendants do not plead guilty and to improve the fairness of plea 
bargains, legislatures should also adopt broad pre-plea discovery.125 
Specifically, discovery rules should be amended to require prosecutors to 
disclose to the defense, before a guilty plea, at a minimum, the following 
types of evidence: (1) impeachment and exculpatory evidence, without 
regard to its materiality; (2) witness names and statements, redacted as 
123. ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, COOPERATOR SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 245, 250-51, 
310-12 (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-09-criminal-agenda_book_0.
pdf (endorsing federal court rules that require, among else, that any discussion of presence or 
absence of cooperation be included in a sealed supplement to plea agreements). See generally 
Richman, “Informants and Cooperators,” supra note 7.
124. See, e.g., People v. Ventura, 531 N.Y.S.2d 526, 531 (App. Div. 1988) (holding that “the 
public policy of this State requires that before the People can condition a plea to the defendant’s 
waiver of his right to appellate review, it must advance some legitimate State interest”); Klein 
et al., supra note 80, at 95-106 (discussing state ethical rules that have been interpreted to bar 
negotiated waivers of ineffective assistance of counsel claims); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 
UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B) (2012) (“A term or condition in a pretrial agreement shall 
not be enforced if it deprives the accused of ... the complete and effective exercise of post-trial 
and appellate rights.”).
125. See, e.g., Cruz, supra note 86 (“Congress should pass legislation that requires the 
government—whether constitutionally required or not—to disclose material exculpatory 
evidence before the accused enters into any plea agreement. This reform will reduce the risk of 
false guilty pleas by helping ensure that the accused is better informed before sealing his or her 
fate.”); see also Brown, supra note 66.
Reforming Criminal Justice96
necessary to protect witnesses from risk of harm; and (3) police reports, 
again redacted as needed to protect the safety of witnesses. A number of 
states have already adopted such rules;126 some, like North Carolina and 
Texas, have gone even further and adopted open-file pre-plea discovery.127 
The evidence so far suggests that broad discovery can be implemented 
at a reasonable cost and without undue hardship to witnesses. It is the 
first step toward ensuring that parties are negotiating fair, well-informed, 
and factually based plea bargains and that innocent defendants are not 
coerced into pleading guilty.
For open-file discovery to have its intended positive effects, defense 
counsel must have the time and resources to review and investigate the 
facts revealed through discovery.128 Open-file discovery therefore must be 
coupled with reforms that ensure adequate funding of criminal defense.129 
Legislators, courts, and prosecutors’ offices should also strictly limit or 
entirely prohibit “exploding” offers. Such offers prevent defendants and 
their counsel from adequately evaluating the evidence disclosed and 
conducting further investigations if needed, before making a decision 
whether to plead guilty or proceed to trial. Therefore, states may require 
(as Louisiana has done) that guilty pleas be accepted only after a certain 




126. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.1 (requiring the prosecutor to make available to the defendant 
all reports regarding relevant information within the prosecutor’s control); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16 
(same); N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3 (requiring the prosecutor to put together a discovery packet or allow 
defendant to inspect, copy, and photograph relevant information); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 16 (allowing 
a defendant access to relevant case materials subject to few limitations).
127. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903 (allowing a defendant to make a motion entitling 
her to receive “the complete files of all law enforcement agencies, investigatory agencies, and 
prosecutor’s offices involved in the investigation”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 
(allowing defendants upon request access to documents and items that are “material to any 
matter involved in the action and that are in the possession, custody, or control of the state or 
any person under contract with the state”).
128. E.g., Cruz, supra note 86 (“Mitigating the coercive effect of the plea-bargaining process 
will require empowering the defense. And one way to do that is to reduce the informational 
asymmetry between prosecutors and defense counsel. Plea offers are often foisted upon the 
accused before the defense has had enough time to investigate the facts, and the longer the 
investigation takes, the less generous the plea off may become.”).
129. See Primus, supra note 62.
130. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 559 (banning felony guilty pleas within 48 hours of arrest).
Plea Bargaining 97
discovery available to the defense before a court can accept a guilty plea.131 
Prosecutors’ offices could also consider adopting internal protocols that 
discourage “exploding offers.”132
4. Strengthen judicial oversight of plea bargains and guilty pleas. Judicial 
participation in plea negotiations allows a neutral party to assess the terms 
of the plea bargain and the facts of the case at a point in the proceeding 
when such oversight can make a real difference. A number of states permit 
such participation, and recent qualitative studies suggest that it is perceived 
to provide greater certainty, fairness, and much-needed oversight of the 
plea-bargaining process. The risk of judicial coercion can be minimized 
through procedures that allow a different judge to preside over trial when 
plea bargaining falls apart.133 Legislators should therefore expressly permit 
judicial participation in plea negotiations, but require judicial recusal if a 
case proceeds to trial after negotiations fail.
At a minimum, legislators should demand that judges conduct a 
more searching inquiry into the facts underlying the guilty plea and 
accompanying agreement. Judges should not rely merely on factual 
stipulations or summaries of the evidence presented by the prosecution, 
but should question the defendant and review any available materials to 
ensure that the conviction and the proposed plea agreement reflect the 
true facts of the case. Military courts—as well as courts in continental 
European systems that have adopted plea bargaining—engage in more 
thorough vetting of the facts before accepting guilty pleas, and they can 
offer helpful guidance for civilian U.S. jurisdictions.134
5. Adopt limits on plea discounts. Courts and legislatures should also 
limit the charging and sentencing concessions that prosecutors can offer 
in exchange for a guilty plea. Enormous discounts heighten the risk of 
innocent persons pleading guilty and may produce unjust sentencing 
disparities. Legislatures can address this problem by limiting plea 
discounts to no more than a third of the expected post-trial sentence; 
alternatively or in addition, courts can use any sentencing discretion 
they have to reduce discounts that are more than 30% to 35%.135 In many 
U.S. jurisdictions today, prosecutors can circumvent plea-discount caps 
through their charging decisions. But the experience of foreign systems 
131. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14.
132. O’Hear, supra note 76, at 431.
133. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 104-106.
135. See supra note 88.
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like England and Germany suggests that such limits can be effective if 
coupled with broader judicial discretion to scrutinize charges and impose 
proportionate sentences. For that reason, policymakers should consider 
this proposal in tandem with ideas for comprehensive reform of the 
criminal justice system. Excising overlapping criminal statutes—a stated 
goal of reformers—would constrain prosecutorial discretion to evade plea-
discount limits through charge bargains.136 Reducing sentencing severity 
and restoring judicial discretion over sentencing can also help courts 
ensure that plea discounts remain reasonable. Finally, chief prosecutors 
themselves can also take the initiative and adopt internal regulations that 
limit the size of plea discounts line prosecutors can offer.
The proposals above offer a range of practical solutions that can help make 
plea bargaining fairer, more transparent, and more honest. Given the central 
place of plea bargaining in our criminal justice system, any serious reform of 
the process ought to consider them.
136. For discussions of the overcriminalization phenomenon, see Douglas Husak, 
“Overcriminalization,” in Volume 1 of the present Report; and Stephen F. Smith, 
“Overfederalization,” in Volume 1 of the present Report.
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